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Abstract
Historical evidence suggests that poor population groups are more
likely to engage in conict. We construct a theoretical model of the
choice between appropriation and production. Fully specied produc-
tion functions allow for both symmetrical outcomes and for introduc-
ing inequalities in abilities and endowments. It is examined under
what conditions income and capital redistribution, as well as educa-
tion, health and poverty-alleviation spending reduce the incentives for
appropriation. Empirical evidence is presented that is consistent with
the theory.
JEL Classication: D02, D74, H50, I30.
Keywords: Conict, deprivation, welfare state, poverty, appro-
priative activities.
1 Introduction
It is an established empirical nding that deprivation breads conict1. For
example, in countries such as South Africa, Rwanda, Guatemala, Nicaragua,
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El Salvador or Iran poverty and inequality played a major role in the occur-
rence of political violence during the last century (cf. Muller and Seligson,
1987, for a discussion). A natural question to ask is if the harmful e¤ects of
deprivation can be reversed by welfare state policies.
In the present contribution a game-theoretic model of civil war will be
built. The model is designed to study how deprivation and redistributive
policies a¤ect the level of conict in the absence of property rights protection.
First, it will be shown how poverty fuels war by lowering the opportunity
cost of appropriative activities.2 In the main part of the theoretical analy-
sis it will be assessed under what conditions welfare state institutions can
lower the risk of appropriative conict. In particular, the e¤ects of income
transfers, capital redistribution and productivity-enhancing policies such as
education and public health programmes will be studied. Towards the end
of the paper, some empirical evidence will be presented that is consistent
with the models predictions.
Various literatures are relevant for the present contribution. Macro- and
micro-level empirical evidence suggests that it makes sense to link the issues
of conict, deprivation, inequality and welfare state institutions: Poverty
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004; Do and Iyer, 2007;
Collier and Rohner, 2008), inequality (Muller and Seligson, 1987; Deininger,
2003), and lack of education (Deininger, 2003) have been found to increase
the risk of political violence. Justino (2005) has found that redistributive
policies have been e¤ective in reducing unrest on the local level in India.
Despite the empirical results, only relatively few theoretical models have
focused on these issues. The contributions of Grossman (1995), Azam (2001)
and Noh (2002) examine the deterrent e¤ect of income transfers on appro-
priative activities. Brito and Intriligator (1985) link the possibility of avoid-
ing inter-state wars through resource transfers with the issue of imperfect
information, and Grossman (1994) emphasizes that land reforms can result
in less appropriative activities. A related paper of Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2008)
studies the e¤ect of redistribution between capital- and labour-intensive in-
dustries.
However, most of these important contributions studying particular wel-
fare state policies use models in which asymmetry between the two types of
players is inherent in the model. As the roles, for example, predator versus
prey, or landowner versus peasant families, are assigned from the beginning,
these models do not account for a symmetric outcome, with all players choos-
ing some part of appropriative activities.3 Moreover, these models focus on
2As dened in the present contribution, appropriative activities include actions taken
with the aim of altering the existing distribution of social wealth in favour of the player
who takes the action. The focus lies on appropriation related to civil wars.
3Of course there are some other papers in the economics of conict literature that allow
for symmetrical outcomes with all players choosing some part of time for appropriation
(e.g. Grossman and Kim, 1995). However, they do not treat the impact of welfare state
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one policy issue at a time and do not allow for considering the impact of
various welfare state institutions within one single framework. Furthermore,
these articles focus mainly on income transfers, but do not treat other wel-
fare state policies such as capital redistribution4, education5, health policy
and anti-poverty-programmes.
Thus, there is still an important need for further research linking conict
and the welfare state. The contribution of the present paper is of three kinds:
First, I will build a conict model that allows for symmetrical outcomes and
includes fully specied production functions, enabling us to study the impact
of several distinct welfare state policies at the same time. Second, I will not
only focus on income taxation, but will as well analyze capital redistribution,
education spending, health policy and anti-poverty-programmes, which have
rarely been treated in the context of our research question. Third, the impact
of welfare state policies will be assessed empirically with the help of panel
data for 155 countries over a period of 40 years. The empirical results are
in line with the models predictions, although due to a lack of more detailed
data it is not possible to rule out all possible alternative mechanisms.
The remaining part of the present contribution is organized as follows:
Section 2 builds a simple model of appropriative conict, and section 3
focuses on the impact of several welfare state policies. Section 4 presents
some empirical evidence and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Assumptions
Since for armed conicts usually large groups of the population of a given
country or region are involved, a framework with two aggregate players
is appropriate. Each player represents the aggregate choice of individuals
being part of two larger groups of the society. For example, one player could
represent the people from some ethnic group A, and the other player people
from another ethnic group B.
Both groups have the choice between productive (L) and appropriative
(F) activities. As dened earlier, appropriative activities are unproductive
and aim to alter the existing distribution of social welfare. Even though they
may be utility maximizing for a particular group, they are socially harmful
and constitute a net deadweight loss on the level of the society as a whole.
policies.
4The model studying land reforms in Grossman (1994) is quite specically designed for
treating the factor of production "land". It cannot easily be generalized for other kinds
of endowments, such as capital. Similarly, Brito and Intriligators (1985) model focuses
on the question of imperfect information, and is not designed for analyzing the impact of
welfare state policies, such as capital redistribution.
5Grossman and Kim (2003) link the issues of education and conict. However, they
focus on explaining di¤erences across countries in educational policies.
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There is only one output good, y, which is produced using two inputs,
labour (L) and capital (K). Whereas L is the choice variable, K is assumed
to be a given endowment of capital and land.
The payo¤of each group consists of the non-stolen part of its own produc-
tion plus the part of the opponents production that it steals. For simplicity,
the appropriated part of the other groups production depends linearly on
the time share a group spends on appropriative activities. I include a para-
meter  for group 1 (and  for group 2) which represents a friction in the
appropriation activity. Our friction loss is similar to the one of iceberg trade
costs. A part of the stolen production from the other group is lost due to
ghting or transportation.
We have the following payo¤ (utility) functions for the two groups:
Vi = (1  Fj)yi + Fiyj = Ljyi + (1  Li)yj (1)
subject to the time constraint Li + Fi = 1.
Moreover, we include Cobb-Douglas production functions y1 = La1K
b
1
and y2 = Lc2K
d
2 , where ; =total factor productivities; a,b,c,d=parameters.
The functions show decreasing marginal returns for the choice variable L and
for K, i.e. a<1,b<1,c<1,d<1. There is no need to make any restrictions with
respect to the level of returns to scale (although one would typically think
of constant returns to scale). We get the following payo¤ function for group
1 (this is analogous for group 2):
V1 = L2L
a
1K
b
1 + (1  L1)Lc2 Kd2 (2)
Given that the main purpose of the paper is to study the e¤ects of
redistribution on the time devoted to production and appropriation, it is
desirable to include production functions with decreasing returns to labour
and complementarities between labour and capital (as is the case of the
Cobb-Douglas form). Like in several recent papers we include linear appro-
priation technologies (e.g. Rohner, 2006; Besley and Persson, 2009, 2009b),
and model contest as mutual stealing. This has the crucial advantage that
we can incorporate production functions with decreasing returns to labour,
while keeping the model analytically solvable. Indeed, for the main alterna-
tive di¤erence- or ratio-form contest success functions with Cobb-Douglas
production functions in the rst order conditions the choice variable L1
would take various powers6, ruling out an analytical solution. Thus, in these
6This is for example the case for the di¤erence-form specication, V1 = ( 12 +  ((1  
L1)   (1   L2)))

La1K
b
1 + 
Lc2 K
d
2

, or the following ratio-form specication, V1 =
(1 L1)
(1 L1)+(1 L2)

La1K
b
1 + 
Lc2 K
d
2

.
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cases the model would only be analytically solvable with simplied produc-
tion functions featuring constant returns to labour (and implying increasing
returns to scale when capital is included).
The advantages of our modelling framework come at the price of slightly
more complicated comparative statics. As the model features multiple equi-
libria we will have to focus on how welfare state policies can rotate the
reaction functions in a way that makes the "low appropriation" equilibrium
feasible and increases its basin of attraction, and we cannot simply per-
form directly comparative statics with a unique stable interior equilibrium.
However, as discussed in Appendix A the predictions of the model do not
critically depend on the functional forms chosen and are robust to a wide
range of modelling approaches. In particular, for frameworks with standard
di¤erence- or ratio-form contest success functions yielding unique interior
Nash equilibria the predicted impact of various welfare state policies would
be extremely similar.
2.2 The Equilibria
Setting @Vi@Li equal to zero, we get the rst order conditions (the second order
conditions hold). Reformulating, the following expression is obtained for
group 1 (it is analogous for group 2):
L1 =

a

 1
1 a
K
b
1 a
1 K
 d
1 a
2 L
1 c
1 a
2 (3)
Given the time constraint, the labour time is bounded between 0 and 1,
i.e. 0  Li  1.
For describing graphically the Nash equilibria we can, without loss of gen-
erality, rst focus on a symmetrical case where a = c; b = d;  = ;  = :
Figure 17 displays the reaction functions for particular values of the dif-
ferent parameters. We will rst consider the case of a ghting-trap. For 
1 a
 1
1 a K
b
1 a
i K
  d
1 a
j < 1 (as in the case of the dotted curves RF1 and
RF2), there is only one single Nash equilibrium, (0,0). If group 1s (black)
reaction function rotates towards the north-west, and group 2s (grey) re-
action function rotates towards the south-east, we will eventually end up
in the case where
 
1 a
 1
1 a K
b
1 a
i K
  d
1 a
j = 1, with the two Nash equi-
libria (0,0) and (1,1). This corresponds to the solid lines RF1and RF2.
The outcome (1,1) is Pareto-superior to (0,0). Continuing to rotate the
reaction functions further (not displayed in gure 1) will lead to the case
7Case 1: a=0.5, b=0.5,  = 0:5;  = 2; K1 = 1; K2 = 1. The black dotted line is the
reaction function of group 1 (RF1), whereas the grey dotted line refers to the reaction
function of group 2 (RF2). Case 2: a=0.5, b=0.5,  = 0:5;  = 4; K1 = 1; K2 = 1.
The black solid line represents the reaction function of group 1 (RF1), the grey solid line
corresponds to the reaction function of group 2 (RF2).
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Figure 1: Reaction functions for di¤erent parameter values
where
 
1 a
 1
1 a K
b
1 a
i K
  d
1 a
j > 1. In this situation we obtain three Nash
equilibria, (0,0), (1,1), and an intermediate one. If we assume simple out-of-
equilibrium dynamics8, we are able to describe the basins of attraction for
the case with three equilibria (cf. gure 2).
The two extreme value equilibria E, (0,0), and E, (1,1), in gure 2 are
stable, whereas the intermediate equilibrium Eis unstable. Towards the
south-west of the intermediate equilibrium is the basin of attraction of the
"bad" equilibrium E, (0,0), and in the north-east of the intermediate equilib-
rium is the basin of attraction of the "good" equilibrium E, (1,1). The more
RF1 rotates to the north-west and the more RF2 rotates to the south-east,
the more the intermediate equilibrium Emoves to the south-west. This
results in the basin of attraction of the "bad" equilibrium becoming smaller
and the basin of attraction of the "good" equilibrium becoming larger.9
8For fully characterizing the out-of-equilibrium dynamics, a dynamic framework with
di¤erential equations is needed. Deriving a dynamic version of our static model is straight-
forward. Assuming that the labour time of group 1 increases linearly in the di¤erence
between the marginal returns to productive activities and to appropriative activities, we
obtain:

L1 = (L2aL
a 1
1 K
b
1   Lc2 Kd2 ), where =parameter related to the speed of
adjustment. It is analogous for

L2. Putting

L1 =

L2 = 0, we obtain the equilibrium lines
that are identical to the reaction functions of the static model. The equilibria correspond
to the intersection of the equilibrium lines. A similar modelling approach for making a
static model dynamic is used and discussed in more detail in Rohner and Frey (2007).
9For our kind of setting with strategic complementarities, the issue of equilibrium
selection can easily be treated in a more explicit way using global games. In Rohner and
Frey (2007) it is shown that, for a similar model structure, the results from comparative
6
E' = (0,0)
E'''
E'' = (1,1)
1
1
L1
L2
RF1
RF2
Figure 2: Basins of attraction for the case of three equilibria
The focus of the comparative statics lies on how to achieve the "good"
outcome (1,1), if the country is initially stuck in the "ghting-trap" (0,0).10
Therefore, it is assumed that at rst
 
1 a
 1
1 a K
b
1 a
i K
  d
1 a
j < 1. It will be
shown that under certain conditions welfare state policies rotate group 1s
reaction function towards the north-west, and group 2s reaction function
towards the south-east in gure 1. If the policy shock is big enough, it
becomes possible to achieve multiple equilibria, whereas (0,0) is still possible,
but (1,1) is now a potential outcome as well. Thus, the framework becomes
a "coordination"-game. Further, as seen before, the more RF1 rotates to the
north-west and RF2 rotates to the south-east, the smaller becomes the basin
of attraction of the "bad" equilibrium and the larger becomes the basin of
attraction of the "good" equilibrium. In this case the likelihood of ending
up in a "ghting-trap" decreases, and the good outcome (1,1) is more likely
to be achieved.
As explained above, rotations of RF1 to the north-west and of RF2
to the south-east are always a good thing in terms of political stability.
Therefore, in such a setting of multiple equilibria it is most convenient for
statics are identical for an explicit equilibrium selection model using global games and for
an approach based on shifts in the reaction functions and basins of attractions, as is done
in the present contribution.
10The present analysis is based on the framework of a static game. If the game were to
be repeated, cooperation could be fostered through strategies such as "grim strategy" or
"tit-for-tat".
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the comparative statics section to focus on the rotations.11
For the sake of completeness, we can compute the value of the interme-
diate Nash equilibria, by plugging one reaction function into the other. The
intermediate equilibrium for L1 is given by equation (4) (this is analogous
for group 2).
L1 =
"
a

 1
1 a

c

 1 c
(1 a)(1 c)
K
( b
1 a 
b(1 c)
(1 a)(1 c) )
1 K
d(1 )
(1 a)(1 c)
2
# 1
1  (1 a)(1 c)
(1 a)(1 c)
(4)
2.3 The Role of Poverty and Development
In the present subsection we shall discuss how in an initial framework with-
out state intervention the level of productivity and capital endowments mat-
ter for conict.
Proposition 1 i) When a group 1 has a higher productivity  and greater
capital endowment K1, ceteris paribus it is less likely to spend time for
appropriative activities. ii) A general increase in development (i.e. a parallel
increase in  and ), makes appropriative conict less likely.
Proof. i) Follows from the derivatives @L1=@ > 0 and @L1=@K1 > 0 of
equation (3). A larger L1 (for a given L2) corresponds to an upward rotation
of group 1s reaction function, which decreases the basin of attraction of the
equilibrium (0,0). ii) This is due to  < 1.
Intuitively, the higher the total factor productivity and the bigger the
capital endowment of a group, the greater the opportunity cost of engaging
in appropriation.
The prediction of the model that higher total factor productivity results
in lowered incentives for engaging in civil conict is in line with the macro-
level evidence of Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), Col-
lier and Rohner (2008) and Collier, Hoe­ er and Rohner (2009), and micro-
level evidence of Do and Iyer (2007).12
11Appendix A is devoted to the discussion of alternative frameworks with simplied
production functions but featuring unique interior equilibria, thus allowing simpler (in
equilibrium) comparative statics. However, all predictions on the impact of welfare state
policies are very similar for all these alternative frameworks.
12These empirical ndings are challenged by Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Berrebi
(2007), who nd no or even a positive correlation between education and the likelihood of
engaging in terrorism. However, their ndings could be due to an excess supply of volun-
teers and the terrorist organization picking the most skilled ones. In this case, raising the
general education level would not lead to more terrorism and conict. Another explanation
for their results is that schooling in countries like Palestine is not always productivity-
enhancing, but often contains a strong element of indoctrination, hate campaigns and
misinformation (Berrebi, 2003; Gentzkow and Shapiro, 2004).
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3 The E¤ects of Welfare State Policies
In this part we will focus on the impact of di¤erent welfare state policies on
the groupsdecisions between productive and appropriative activities. We
should note that the rst-best policy would be the enforcement of property
rights, eliminating appropriative activities altogether. Accordingly, welfare
state institutions represent only a second-best policy that becomes impor-
tant when property rights protection is imperfect.
The analysis of the present section builds on the assumption that the
state in question can raise taxes and assure redistribution, but is not able
to fully secure property rights. For many developing countries such an as-
sumption is reasonable, as states can be "strong" with respect to one policy
dimension, but "weak" with respect to the other dimension.
In countries such as Sri Lanka, Colombia, Brazil or Nigeria raising taxes
and conducting scal and welfare state policies is possible. The presence
of rebel groups in some of those countries makes the collection of taxes
more di¢ cult in some regions than in others, but larger rms cannot escape
taxation independently of their location. Also, some kinds of taxes, such
as export taxes or import tari¤s (which de facto at least partially reduce
the surplus of the domestic rms) can be levied quite independently of the
ongoing conict.
At the same time the e¤ective protection of property rights is not assured,
at least in large parts of those countries. In many areas the slender police and
army forces do not even dare to enter, and in others an e¤ective protection
of property rights is made impossible by the poor law system. Even in parts
of some OECD-countries property rights are not e¤ectively protected (e.g.
Chiapas in Mexico or some parts of Southern Italy), although taxation is
possible.
We can regard the society as being composed of two types of groups: One
"high productivity" and one "low productivity". Our framework is exible
enough to apply to class conicts or to conicts between a dominant ethnic
group and a disenfranchised ethnic minority group.
In the framework of our model, the "low productivity" group would typ-
ically have greater incentives than the "high productivity" one for choosing
appropriative activities (cf. proposition 1) The goal of the following analysis
is to assess under what conditions welfare state policies could prevent the two
groups, and in particular the "low productivity" group, from appropriative
activities.
3.1 Income Taxation for Transfers
First, we will focus on transfers from the high income group to the low
income group by the means of proportional income taxation at a rate t.
The tax revenue is used for the provision of (non-appropriable) public goods
9
and services that benet both groups to an equal extent. For simplicity,
it is assumed that each group receives public goods and services of the
amount t(y1+y2)2 .
13 Given that each group contributes di¤erent amounts of
tax payments but receives the same level of public goods and services in
return, this setting corresponds to net transfers from the high income group
to the low income group.
The timing is as follows. First, groups decide how much labour time
they want to invest in production. Then, the state taxes a proportion t of
the total production income of both groups. Finally, the groups appropriate
a part of the disposable output of the opponent (where Fi = 1   Li) and
the state provides its goods and services. The payo¤ function of group 1
becomes (it is analogous for group 2):
V1 = L2(1  t)y1 + (1  L1) [(1  t)y2] + t(y1 + y2)
2
(5)
Introducing the production function in (5), we obtain:
V1 = L2(1 t)La1Kb1+(1 L1)(1 t)Lc2 Kd2 +
t(La1K
b
1 + L
c
2K
d
2 )
2
(6)
From the rst order conditions follows reaction function (7) for group 1
(for group 2 the result is similar):
L1 =
"
aKb1
Lc2 K
d
2
# 1
1 a (1  t)L2 + t2
(1  t)
 1
1 a
(7)
Taking the rst derivative of (7) with respect to t, we can see under
what conditions more income taxation leads to more or less appropriative
activities. As we are interested in the direction of the shift of the reaction
function, we have to focus on the change in L1 for a change in t, holding
L2 constant at a given level. The approach will be similar in the other
subsections.
@L1
@t
= (
1
1  a)
"
aKb1
Lc2 K
d
2
# 1
1 a (1  t)L2 + t2
(1  t)
 a
1 a
(8)"
1
2   (1  )L2 + t2(1 t)
(1  t)
#
Whether the expression (8) is positive or negative depends exclusively on
the numerator of the last term in (8) (as all other terms are unambiguously
positive).
13The results are robust to alternative ways of modelling public goods and service pro-
vision.
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Figure 3: The impact of income taxation for an intermediate level of appro-
priation friction
Note that the "high appropriation" equilibrium, which was L1 = L2 = 0
for zero taxation, t = 0, becomes now interior for positive taxation levels.
This new interior equilibrium is stable. Mathematically, we can easily see
that 12 (1 )L2+ t2(1 t) > 0 always holds for L2 = 0. Thus, independently
of the parameter values, the "high appropriation" equilibrium with income
taxation is always characterized by positive levels of labour, i. e. L1 > 0,
L2 > 0.
This new interior "high appropriation" equilibrium is displayed as Efor
particular parameter values14 in gure 3. The dashed curves correspond to
the case of no income taxation, t = 0, while the solid curves represent a case
of a proportional income tax of twenty percent, t = 0.2.
The e¤ect of income taxation on the position of the unstable equilibrium
(labelled Ein gure 2, and labelled E, resp. E in the present gure 3)
is a priori ambiguous and depends on the parameter values. For low and
intermediate levels of appropriation friction (i.e.   0:5), 12   (1   )L2 +
t
2(1 t) > 0 always holds, and this intermediate unstable equilibrium moves
towards the origin, increasing thereby the basin of attraction of the stable
"low appropriation" equilibrium with L1 = L2 = 1. For this case income
taxation always unambiguously decreases the scope for conict. This is
displayed as the move from E to Ein gure 3 (where  = 0:5).
14As in gure 1, we set for gure 3 a = b = 0.5,  = 0:5; K1 = K2 = 1. Further,
 =  = 4:3. For the dashed curves t = 0, while for the solid curves t = 0.2.
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For more appropriation friction and thus lower levels of , this unstable
intermediate level can sometimes move towards (1,1), thereby decreasing
the basin of attraction of the "good" equilibrium. We obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 2 An income transfer from the better-o¤ to the worse-o¤ group
through income taxation always leads to a move of the "high appropriation"
equilibrium from L1 = 0, L2 = 0 to a stable interior equilibrium with L1 > 0,
L2 > 0.
The resulting change in the unstable intermediate equilibrium (labelled
E in gure 3) is a priori ambiguous and depends on the parameter values.
This equilibrium moves towards the origin (and thus increases the basin of
attraction of the "good" equilibrium (1,1)) if 12   (1  )L2+ t2(1 t) > 0, i.e.
for a low L2, for a high  and a high t.
Proof. Follows from equation (8) and the discussion above.
These ndings can be interpreted as follows. For a high , which corre-
sponds to a low friction of stealing, more redistribution decreases the incen-
tives for appropriative activities. Intuitively, if a group knows that it will get
a substantial part of the other groups production through redistribution,
it will have less incentives to steal. For a very low , stealing becomes in
any case less of an issue, and the dominant impact of a rise in taxes are the
reduced incentives for productive activities.
The situation is similar for the level of L2. If we are in a ghting-trap
(low level of L2), the disincentives of stealing dominate, whereas if a country
is doing well (high level of L2), the disincentives of taxation on production
e¤ort dominate.
One can think of the redistribution process as institutionalized "steal-
ing" from the rich for giving it to the poor, managed by the state. Unlike
redistribution through appropriative activities, redistribution through the
state does not involve a friction cost of ghting and does not lead to an
opportunity cost of time spent for appropriation. More formally, for a given
amount M transferred from a better-o¤ group 1 to a worse-o¤ group 2,
the beneciary (group 2) prefers redistribution through the welfare state
rather than through appropriation, as in the former case group 2 receives
the full amount M and has freed time for productive activities, while in the
latter case group 2 only receives an amount M<M (due to the friction of
ghting). Group 1 loses under both mechanisms an amount M and is indif-
ferent. Thus, redistribution through the welfare state of a given amount M
is Pareto-superior to appropriation, as at least one group is better o¤ and
12
no group is worse o¤.1516
Under what conditions does a government have incentives to implement
a redistribution policy? The decision of a generally benevolent government
is considered, whose utility function is a weighted combination of the util-
ity functions of groups 1 and 2: VG = 'V1 + (1   ')V2, where '=weight
attributed to group 1. If the government is composed of only members of
group 1 (resp., group 2), we would have ' = 1 (resp., ' = 0).
Would a government that is exclusively composed of members of group
1 ever have incentives for redistributing output or capital if group 1 happens
to be the wealthier group? First, the case where

a

 1
1 a
K
b
1 a
1 K
 d
1 a
2 < 1
and

c

 1
1 c
K
d
1 c
2 K
 b
1 c
1 < 1 should be considered. In this situation, the
reaction functions only intersect once at the ghting equilibrium (0,0), which
results in both groups and the government all receiving a payo¤ of zero, i.e.
V1 = 0, V2 = 0, VG = 0. Clearly, redistribution would be advantageous for
everybody, at least up to the point when the reaction functions intersect a
second time and (1,1) becomes feasible, i.e. where

a

 1
1 a
K
b
1 a
1 K
 d
1 a
2 = 1
and

c

 1
1 c
K
d
1 c
2 K
 b
1 c
1 = 1. Thus, any government would have incentives
to implement redistribution. From that point onwards a government that
is mainly composed of members of the wealthier group would face a trade-
o¤, as on the one hand redistribution leads to direct losses of the better-o¤
group, but on the other hand also reduces the risk of conict. In order to
treat this outcome more explicitly, we would have to explicitly address the
issue of equilibrium selection, which we do not do due to space limitations.
3.2 Redistribution of Capital and Land
It has been shown in the literature that conicts are often associated with
land and asset inequality (André and Platteau, 1998; Deininger, 2003). How-
ever, it is controversial if and under what conditions reforms leading to a
more egalitarian land distribution can reduce the risk of conict. While
some scholars argue that land reforms can reduce the scope for conict
(Grossman, 1994; Sweig, 2002), other scholars stress that in some cases land
redistribution has either no e¤ects or can even increase the risk of conict
due to enhanced competition (Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 2000; Bandiera,
2003).
15We have not taken the increase in the demand for "leisure" and the administrative
costs caused by redistribution (e.g. individuals must comply with means-tested criteria,
the need to travel long distances etc) into account. These factors can result in a deadweight
loss.
16An interesting variation of the policy of forfeit income transfers would be transfers
dependent on the receiving group choosing a zero (or very low) level of appropriation.
Such conditional transfers could enhance the incentives of behaving in a peaceful way.
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In the present subsection we shall assess theoretically under what con-
ditions capital and land redistribution17 can reduce the scope for conict.
Each groups time spent for productive activities increases in its own
capital and decreases in the opponents capital. We can easily see this by
taking for equation (3) the rst derivative of L1 with respect toK1 (displayed
in equation (9)) and K2 (displayed in equation (10)). This is similar for the
reaction function of the second group.
@L1
@K1
=

b
1  a

a

 1
1 a
K
a+b 1
1 a
1 K
 d
1 a
2 L
1 c
1 a
2 > 0 (9)
@L1
@K2
=
  d
1  a

a

 1
1 a
K
b
1 a
1 K
a d 1
1 a
2 L
1 c
1 a
2 < 0 (10)
Thus, the impact of capital redistribution in the present framework is
ambiguous18. If capital is redistributed from group 1 to group 2, typically
group 2 has smaller incentives for appropriative activities, but group 1s
incentives for ghting increase. Simple capital transfers between large pop-
ulation segments do not appear to be an e¢ cient policy for avoiding conict.
However, there is a caveat to this result, when not all capital is employed
in production (due to limitations and constraints of the production technol-
ogy), but a part of it is consumed. We can assume for now that there is a
maximum amount of capital, K, which the production technology allows
for.
Assume that initially group 1 has excess capital: K1 = K+KEX , where
KEX=excess capital not employed in the production. For a policy that
redistributesKEX from group 1 to group 2, the employed capitalK1 remains
constant at K, while K2 increases by an amount KEX . The impact on L1
equals @L1@K2 =

 d
1 a

a

 1
1 a
K
b
1 a
1 K
a d 1
1 a
2 L
1 c
1 a
2 < 0. Group 1 produces
less, as group 2 becomes a better prey due to an increased capital stock.
For group 2, the e¤ect equals @L2@K2 =

d
1 c

c

 1
1 c
K
c+d 1
1 c
2 K
 b
1 c
1 L
1 a
1 c
1 > 0.
If the parameter values of the two groups are similar, the second e¤ect of
17The parameter K in the model captures both physical capital and land. Including an
additional factor of production for land would not a¤ect the results.
18The impact of capital redistribution can be assessed in a more formal way. If
the intermediate equilibrium moves to the south-west (which corresponds to a de-
crease of L1 and L2), the basin of attraction of the good equilibrium increases and
the basin of attraction of the bad equilibrium decreases. This leads to a lower risk
of conict. Formally, this corresponds to the following condition for group 1. L01 =
a

 1
1 a   c

 1 c
(1 a)(1 c) (K1 +t)
( b
1 a 
b(1 c)
(1 a)(1 c) )(K2  t)
d(1 )
(1 a)(1 c)
 1
1  (1 a)(1 c)
(1 a)(1 c)
<L1 =

a

 1
1 a   c

 1 c
(1 a)(1 c) K
( b
1 a 
b(1 c)
(1 a)(1 c) )
1 K
d(1 )
(1 a)(1 c)
2
 1
1  (1 a)(1 c)
(1 a)(1 c) . For
the second group it is similar.
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@L2
@K2
> 0 is stronger than the rst one, @L1@K2 < 0. The intuitive reason for
this is that appropriation involves a friction cost, i.e.  < 1. Therefore
the increased incentives for production of the formerly capital-poor group
2 are not fully o¤set by the enhanced appropriation incentives of group 1.
This is displayed in the equation below (for convenience and without loss of
generality the parameter values are taken as symmetrical):
 @L2@K2
   @L1@K2
 = (1  ) b1  a

a

 1
1 a
K
b d+a 1
1 a
1 L
1 c
1 a
2 > 0 (11)
Redistribution leads to a more substantial rotation of group 2s reaction
function than of group 1s reaction function. In this way the basin of attrac-
tion of the good equilibrium should usually increase. Thus, when a part of
the capital of the capital-rich group is not fully employed in the production
process, but consumed, capital and land redistribution can reduce conict.
Redistribution of capital that is not productively employed could take the
form of a tax on certain luxury goods.
Another caveat is that in a setting with intra-group inequality capital
redistribution can reduce conict. This is the case studied in Grossman
(1994). Also in the present framework we obtain under some conditions this
result when we allow for intra-group inequality.19
The ndings of this subsection are summarized in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 3 Capital redistribution is not an e¢ cient measure to reduce
conict, if all capital is employed in production. When a part of the capital is
consumed rather than invested, redistribution can lead to less appropriation.
Proof. Follows from equation (11) and the discussion above.
3.3 Education, Public Health and Poverty Alleviation Pro-
grammes
In this part we will examine what happens if taxation revenue is not sim-
ply transferred, but spent on education, health and poverty-alleviation pro-
grammes, which eventually lead to a higher total factor productivity. Thus,
we have the following payo¤ function for group 1 (for group 2 it is analo-
gous):
V1 = L2(1  t)y1 + (1  L1) [(1  t)y2] (12)
Introducing the production functions in (12), we obtain:
19The derivations of the case with intra-group inequality are available from the author.
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V1 = L2(1  t)(t)La1Kb1 + (1  L1)(1  t)((t))Lc2 Kd2 (13)
Please note that now  and  are assumed to be strictly increasing
concave functions of t, i.e.  = (t) and  = (t).
We obtain reaction function (14) for group 1 (it is analogous for group
2):
L1 = ((t))
1
1 a ((t))
 
1 aa
1
1 aK
b
1 a
1 K
 d
1 a
2 L
1 c
1 a
2 (1  t)
1 
1 a (14)
The partial derivative of L1 with respect to t is positive under the con-
dition that 1
@
@t    @@t > 1 1 t :
This means that education, health and anti-poverty spending are likely
to increase the labour time of a given group if it has a low initial level of total
factor productivity and if the policy measures much increase its productivity.
By contrast, the increase in the total factor productivity of the opponent
tends to decrease the rst groups incentives to pursue productive activities.
This is intuitive, as an increase in the productivity of the opponent group
makes it a more attractive target. However, for most parameter values it is
likely that these three policies lead to less conict overall, as the conict-
reducing term 1
@
@t is multiplied by 1, whereas the conict-enhancing term
1

@
@t is multiplied by  < 1.
This becomes more apparent, if we focus on the symmetrical case, where
 = . In this case, the condition for education, health and anti-poverty
spending to reduce conict becomes: @@t >
(t)
(1 t) .
It follows from our assumptions that taxation has a positive impact on
the total factor productivity . Thus, @@t  0. The concavity assump-
tion implies that the marginal productivity of taxation spending is strictly
decreasing. Thus, @
2
(@t)2
< 0.
For low levels of  and t the derivative @@t is big, and it is likely that
condition @@t >
(t)
(1 t) holds. Proposition 4 summarizes these insights.
Proposition 4 When the total factor productivity is a strictly increasing
concave function of education, health and poverty-alleviation spending, mar-
ginally increasing the public expenditures for these policies increases the
overall time spent on productive activities if the country is "stuck" in a
low productivity- and low taxation- equilibrium.
Proof. Follows from equation (14) and the discussion above.
The policy implications for reducing conict, i.e. to increase spend-
ing on education, health and poverty-alleviation programmes if total factor
productivity is low, appear reasonable. Increases in education, health and
anti-poverty spending benet above all the "low productivity" group. This
is the case because the marginal productivity of these policies is decreasing.
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The "low productivity" group is in general the most likely to choose a high
level of appropriative activities. Therefore, education, health promotion and
poverty-alleviation programmes are well-focused.
Furthermore, independently of the impact of an increase in the total
factor productivity on the labour supply of the two groups, such an increase
in the total factor productivity could result in a higher output yi. In fact,
there is a trade-o¤ between the costs of these kinds of public expenditures
and their returns. However, this issue is already well-documented in the
literature and is not directly related to our main focus.
4 Empirical Evidence
It is important to assess whether our theoretical ndings are reasonable
in the light of empirical evidence. As discussed below, due to a lack of
appropriate data we are not able to perform a direct empirical test of the
theory. Therefore we have to limit ourselves to a very general inquiry into
the impact of the welfare state on conict.
In the literature there have been several inuential empirical studies
of civil wars that use cross-country panels (see Fearon and Laitin, 2003;
Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2004). These
studies have mostly focused on socioeconomic explanatory factors of civil
conicts such as economic growth, wealth, ethnicity, natural resources, and
population. There has been little empirical evidence about the impact of
welfare state policies on the likelihood of civil war outbreaks. I would like
to address this shortcoming.
For assuring comparability, I will apply the same data, method and core
specication as used in Fearon and Laitin (2003), one of the most inuential
papers in the eld. I will update the data for a further ve years (2000-2004)
and include welfare state variables. Also, I will include several additional
robustness tests not performed in Fearon and Laitin (2003), using alternative
methods, independent or dependent variables.
4.1 The Data and Method
Panel data for 155 countries from 1965 to 2004 will be used to explain the
likelihood of the outbreak of a civil war. All countries that had a population
of at least half a million in 1990 were included. The start date of 1965 has
been chosen for the reason that, for several of the variables included, there
is no data before 1965. All variables are described in Appendix B.
As is done in Fearon and Laitin (2003), and in almost all other papers
in the eld, I will explain the outbreak of wars rather than the number of
periods of ghting. As dependent variable, civil war onset data from Fearon
and Laitin (2003) has been used. It has been updated for the years 2000
to 2004 using the "Data on Armed Conicts" database of PRIO (2006, in
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collaboration with the University of Uppsala). All internal conicts that
cause more than 1000 battle related deaths for the whole conict are coded
as civil wars. This is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for an
outbreak of war, and 0 if no outbreak of a new war occurs.
The main explanatory and control variables are taken from various sources.
The rst welfare state variable included corresponds to "general government
consumption expenditure" in percent of GDP (World Bank, 2006b). This
captures the size of the state in terms of the size of the economy. The data
is available for most countries and years between 1965 and 2004.
It would be more appealing to use a variable such as "social spending"
or "extent of redistribution", rather than general government expenditure.
However, the data on general government expenditure has the important
advantage of being available for most countries and years and allows for
minimizing the number of missing observations, while the data on social
spending from sources like the government statistics of the IMF is only
available for few countries and years.
It seems defendable to include general government spending in percent
of GDP as a proxy for redistribution, given that typically the states with
most redistribution (for example, the Scandinavian countries) also have the
highest overall level of state expenditure. The Pearson correlation between
the data on general government spending and the data on social spending
that is only available for OECD countries (cf. OECD, 2007) is as high as
0.79. This could indicate that most of the inter-country variation in general
government expenses is due to di¤erences in social transfers, while other
forms of government spending, for example for infrastructure, may vary
less.
To make sure that the government spending variable does not pick up the
e¤ects of military spending, we include military expenditures as a control
variable in the regressions. Thus, the coe¢ cient of government spending
reects the impact of all non-military government expenditures, most of
which have some redistributive component.
The other welfare state variable used as an explanatory variable in this
section is the level of education spending as a percentage of GDP (World
Bank, 2006a). Data for this variable is available from 1970 to 2004, although
not all years are covered.
As shown later, other potential welfare state indicators such as health
spending (World Bank, 2006b), which is only available for certain countries
and years between 1990 and 2004, cannot be included in the regression
analysis due to a lack of observations.
The control variables are the same as the ones included in Fearon and
Laitin (2003), but are updated for the years 2000 to 2004 using the same
method as applied by these authors. Also further variables are included
in the robustness checks. These variables are from various sources and are
explained in detail in Appendix B.
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Sample No civil war Civil war
Goverment spending (in % of GDP), first lag 15.484 15.523 12.82
(n=4597) (n=4532) (n=65)
Education spending (in % of GDP), first lag 4.349 4.36 3.358
(n=2462) (n=2433) (n=29)
Health spending (in % of GDP), first lag 5.905 5.914 4.26
(n=922) (n=917) (n=5)
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (means)
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
In the empirical study of civil wars several methodological issues arise.
Having a limited dependent variable I will, like Fearon and Laitin (2003),
Collier and Hoe­ er (2004), and the vast majority of papers in the eld,
perform logit regressions. Other estimators are included in the robustness
checks.
An important issue is the direction of causality between outbreaks of
civil wars on one hand and economic output and welfare state policies on
the other hand. A negative correlation between these variables could be
due to welfare spending and economic performance decreasing the risk of
civil wars or due to the depressing e¤ect of war on the economy and on
public spending. Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) have solved this
endogeneity problem with the help of instrumental variables (rainfall) for
economic shocks. Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoe­ er (2004)
have addressed endogeneity concerns using lags. For assuring comparability,
I will include like Fearon and Laitin (2003) lags in the core specications.
However, I will instrument for government spending and for education as
robustness checks.
4.2 The Results
Descriptive statistics are useful for gaining an overall view. In table 1 the
di¤erent means of government, education, and health spending in percent
of GDP are displayed for the whole sample included in the data set, as well
as split between the country years that experience an outbreak of civil war
and the others.
The country years where civil wars broke out are associated with a lower
level of government spending (signicant at a 1% level), a lower proportion
of education spending (signicant at a 1% level), and less health spending
(signicant at a 5% level).
When government spending is included in the analysis, most of the civil
wars occurring are in the sample (n=65). It looks more worrying for edu-
cation spending, where only 29 civil wars are included in the sample, and
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for health spending, where the number of wars drops to 5. According to
what control variables are included, these values slightly decrease due to the
missing observations in the control variables.
Given that there are so many missing observations for the health variable,
it will not be included in the regression analysis. The education variable
will rst be included without specic treatment of missing values (i.e. the
standard method of listwise deletion is used). Later on, the regressions
for the education variable will be re-run with missing observations being
imputed using "best subset" regressions.
Regressions are now performed in order to estimate the impact of gov-
ernment spending and education spending on the likelihood of civil war
outbreaks.
Table 2 displays the main results and some robustness checks for the
government spending variable. In column (1) of table 2 the core regression
is shown. As predicted by the theoretical model, lagged government expen-
ditures reduce the likelihood of civil war outbreaks at a level of condence
of 95%. All control variables have the same sign as in Fearon and Laitins
(2003) study, with the exception of the democracy variable (which is in-
signicant in both studies). Also, besides the variable of previous wars, all
variables that they found to be statistically signicant are as well signi-
cant in the present study. Richer countries experience less conict (which is
consistent with our proposition 1), while in more populated, mountainous,
oil-rich, recent and instable states civil wars are more likely.
The marginal e¤ects suggest that government spending has a large im-
pact on the conict risk. A country year with all average characteristics
and with the average level of government spending of 15.5% of GDP has a
risk of 0.64% of experiencing a civil war. By contrast, when a country year
with otherwise identical characteristics has only a government spending level
of 5% the conict risk more than doubles to 1.35%, while for government
spending of 30% of GDP the risk of civil wars drops to only 0.23%.
From column (2) onwards we control for lagged military expenditures20,
as well as for the lagged growth rate, which was omitted in Fearon and Laitin
(2003). As found in Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) and Collier and
Hoe­ er (2004), growth has a negative sign and is statistically signicant.
The conict-reducing impact of government spending remains signicant at
a 5% level in column (2).
20Many observations of military expenditures are missing. To avoid a large drop in
the sample size, we impute the missing observations of this variable using "best subset"
regressions. All variables of the baseline regression of table 2, column (1) have been
included for estimating the missing observations. This technique will be described in more
detail further below. All our results are robust to the use of other methods of imputation,
such as replacing missing observations with the country mean of military spending.
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The results of the following columns survive when the growth and/or
military spending variables are omitted. I have also tested the model with
various other control variables, and the negative e¤ect of government expen-
ditures on conict always remained statistically signicant.
The results are robust to the inclusion of time dummies21 and country
xed e¤ects in column (3). The columns (4) and (5) are devoted to endo-
geneity checks. In column (4) the average of government spending in the
last three years is taken as the main explanatory variable. It still remains
signicant at 5 %. In column (5) an IV probit estimation is performed.
Two variables that are correlated with government spending are taken as
instruments: debt service and the part of the country that is rural. These
variables have not been found to be related to the conict risk in previous
studies (cf. Collier, Hoe­ er and Rohner, 2009), and the Hansen test sug-
gests that the instruments are valid (p-value is 0.542). Government spending
has a war-reducing e¤ect at a condence level of 99%.
In column (6) the model is reestimated with a rare event logit (Relogit)
estimator, using the method of King and Zeng (2001). Again, government
spending reduces conict at a condence level of 99%.
The next two tables are devoted to studying the impact of education
spending in percent of GDP on conict. As we have seen earlier, there is
much more missing data for this variable than for the government spending
variable. The number of observations is almost halved.
In column (1) of table 3 the core model with unimputed education spend-
ing is displayed. The lagged education variable has the right sign, but is not
signicant. In column (2) we instrument for education, using the same in-
struments as in table 2. The instruments pass the Hansen test with a p-value
of 0.121. Now education signicantly decreases conict at a 1% level.
21As in some particular years no conict onsets occur, I have taken 5-year periods for
the time dummies.
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The reason for which the results for education are less clear-cut than
for general government spending could be related to the pronounced drop
in the sample size and the onsets (for the specication of column (1) only
25 war onsets are included in the sample). There are two ways in which
we can investigate this: 1) imputation of the missing observations of the
education variable, 2) using alternative dependent variables that have more
onsets than the civil wars variable. We shall start with the rst possibility.
For countering the problem of data availability, the missing observations
of education spending are imputed for the remaining columns of table 3.
The technique of (single) imputation using regression "best subset" estima-
tions has been used22. With this technique, missing values are estimated
with the help of a regression that includes all other independent variables as
well as further variables and accounts for a degree of random error. (Single)
regression imputation can be used as long as missing observations are either
missing completely at random (MCAR) or missing at random (MAR). This
is the case for our data23. (Single) regression imputation and multiple im-
putation have been shown in the literature (Deville and Särndal, 1994; King
et al., 2001; Little and Rubin, 2002; Acock, 2005) to be much more e¤ec-
tive than other traditional techniques such as mean imputation, conditional
mean imputation or missing data indicators.24
Column (3) of table 3 is devoted to the core regression with the im-
puted education data. Education now has a conict reducing impact that
is signicant at a 5% level. This nding is robust to the inclusion of time
and country xed e¤ects in column (4) and to using the average of the last
three years of education expenditures as the main explanatory variable in
column (5). The IV probit results of column (2) are replicated in column
(6) with the imputed education variable, which is signicant at a 1% level
(the instruments pass the Hansen test with a p-value of 0.992). Finally, the
22The imputation was performed in Stata 9 using the "impute" command. The depen-
dent and all independent variables of the core model of table 2, as well as other variables
that are correlated with education (the lags 1 to 6 of education, the total life expectancy at
birth, the number of hospital beds per 1000 people, the crude birth rate per 1000 people)
were included for the estimation of the missing values of the education variable. These
three additional variables are all from the World Bank (2006b).
23Typically, single and multiple imputation are only problematic when data is not miss-
ing at random (NMAR), which is mostly the case for survey and opinion polls data.
24From a theoretical point of view, multiple (regression) imputation (which creates a
series of di¤erent data sets) is even more powerful than single (regression) imputation,
as it accounts not only for sampling variation, but as well for imputation variation. In
empirical studies both techniques have been found to perform in similarly e¤ective ways
(Ezzati-Rice et al., 1993; Acock, 2005). In the present analysis multiple imputation has
the disadvantage of being more di¢ cult to apply for the robustness checks, where not
only logit estimators are used. However, I have re-run the estimations of the paper using
the multiple imputation procedure Amelia (King et al., 2001) and other methods such as
mean imputation, conditional mean imputation etc and have found similar results as with
single imputation.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coups Guerrilla Warfare Assassinations General Strikes
Educ. Spending (-1) -0.274** -0.0204*** -0.0486*** -0.0370***
(0.109) (0.00475) (0.0124) (0.00725)
GDP per capita (-1) -0.000228* -0.00000789*** -0.0000160*** -0.00000521***
(0.000124) (0.00000122) (0.00000319) (0.00000187)
ln Population (-1) -0.0917 0.0386*** 0.0449*** 0.0369***
(0.128) (0.00604) (0.0157) (0.00922)
Mount. Territory 0.00774 0.00165*** 0.00472*** 0.000527
(0.00643) (0.000394) (0.00103) (0.000602)
Non-conti. Territory -0.644 0.202*** 0.262*** -0.00170
(0.776) (0.0237) (0.0618) (0.0362)
Oil Exporter -0.138 0.0186 0.160*** 0.00946
(0.511) (0.0230) (0.0599) (0.0351)
New State 1.247 -0.0871 -0.189 -0.131
(1.098) (0.0836) (0.218) (0.128)
Instability (-1) 0.561 -0.0870** -0.0584 0.0794
(0.470) (0.0341) (0.0888) (0.0521)
Democracy (-1) -0.0261 0.00896*** 0.0292*** 0.0264***
(0.0523) (0.00233) (0.00608) (0.00357)
Ethnic Fractional. 0.550 0.186*** -0.0395 0.0835
(0.677) (0.0341) (0.0890) (0.0521)
Religious Fractional. -0.296 -0.162*** -0.479*** -0.389***
(0.882) (0.0409) (0.106) (0.0624)
GDP Growth (-1) -0.0271 -0.00173 -0.0150*** -0.00864***
(0.0296) (0.00156) (0.00405) (0.00238)
Constant -1.169 -0.474*** -0.263 -0.247
(2.210) (0.103) (0.270) (0.158)
Observations 2214 2229 2229 2229
(Pseudo-) R2 0.109 0.146 0.075 0.077
Log Likelihood -178.4 -974.5 -3110 -1919
Note: Column(s) (1) = Logit, (2) to (4) = OLS. Dependent variable: as stated in the second row. (-1) = first lag.
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, *** = significant at 10%, 5%, 1% respectively.
Table 4: Education spending and political violence
results also hold for the use of the Relogit estimation method in column (7).
Also quantitatively, the impact of education on the risk of civil war is
substantial (the following marginal e¤ects are based on column (3)). A coun-
try year with all average characteristics and a level of education spending as
percentage of GDP of 6% has the risk of a civil war outbreak in a particular
period of 0.49%, while a country year with otherwise identical characteris-
tics, but with an education spending of 2%, has a conict risk of 1.04% -
which is more than double.
In table 4 we implement the second possibility for dealing with the re-
duced sample size (and do not apply imputation of missing values): We
use other forms of political violence and contention as dependent variables.
These variables are taken from Banks (2005) and are described in detail in
Appendix B. The four variables used, coups (40 onsets), guerrilla warfare
(251 onsets), political assassinations (245 onsets) and general strikes (261
onsets) have signicantly more onsets than the civil war variable (25 onsets)
after inclusion of education.25 For all four dependent variables education
25Di¤erent forms of political violence have di¤erent main explanatory factors. However,
all these phenomena have in common that they are associated with politically motivated
violence, and that they could at least partially be caused by grievances due to deprivation
25
has a violence-reducing e¤ect (signicant at a 5%, resp. 1% level).
5 Conclusion
The present contribution has studied the impact of deprivation in unequal
societies on the choice between appropriative and productive activities, and
the question of whether welfare state policies may be able to reduce the
equilibrium level of appropriation. Conict has been represented as mu-
tual stealing, whereas a friction of ghting has been included. Using fully
specied production functions has allowed for both symmetrical outcomes,
and for the inclusion of inequality in capital endowments and in total factor
productivity. It has been shown that population groups with a lower total
factor productivity spend more time on appropriation.
In the present model, income taxation reduces the incentives for appro-
priation above all if the economy is stuck in a low production trap. For
higher levels of production, under certain conditions the undesirable impact
of distortions and disincentives for productive work due to taxation may
prevail. Capital and land redistribution can reduce appropriation if not
all capital is employed in production. Education, health and anti-poverty
spending have above all an appropriation-reducing impact if the total factor
productivity is initially low.
Empirical evidence has been presented that is consistent with the models
predictions. Higher government and education spending lower the risk of
civil wars. The results are statistically signicant for various specications
and for several robustness checks.
Further research in this area should be encouraged: Generalizing the
ndings for an n-player framework would be useful. Testing the results of
the present contribution more directly with very detailed micro-level data
would also be an interesting research venue.
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Appendix A - Functional Forms for Modelling Ap-
propriation
As mentioned earlier, including both ratio-form or di¤erence-form contest
success functions and Cobb-Douglas production functions leads to a model
that is not analytically solvable. Thus, below I shall rst shortly discuss the
results for a framework with ratio-form contest success functions and sim-
plied production functions. The same setting is used as above in equation
(2), but now in the production functions L1 is included instead of La1, and
L2 instead of Lc2.
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V1 =
(1  L1)
(1  L1) + (1  L2)

L1K
b
1 + 
L2K
d
2

(15)
This leads to the following reaction function for L1 (it is analogous for
L2).
L1 = 2  L2  
vuut(1  L2) 2  L2 + Kd2 L2
Kb1
!
(16)
These reaction functions are now hump-shaped and there exists a unique
stable interior Nash equilibrium. As in the basic model, we have @L1@K1 > 0,
@L1
@ > 0,
@L1
@K2
< 0, @L1@ < 0. Importantly the implications with respect
to Welfare state policies would be the same for this functional form as in
section 3. In particular, the e¤ect of income taxation is non-linear, but it
decreases appropriation in most cases, especially when  is high and initial
production e¤orts are low. Further, capital redistribution is not an e¢ cient
measure for reducing conict, while education and related policies are most
suited to reduce appropriation when initial level of total factor productivity
are low.
Note that these same policy predictions would also be obtained for
di¤erence-form contest success functions with a simplied production func-
tion, such as V1 = (12 +  ((1  L1)  (1  L2)))

L1K
b
1 + 
L2K
d
2

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Appendix B - Data
A description and sources of the data used are listed below.
Assassinations: Number of politically motivated murders or attempted
murders of high government o¢ cials or politicians, from Banks (2005).
Civil war: This variable captures civil conicts with at least 1000 fatali-
ties per conict. The data up to 1999 is from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and
is updated for the years 2000-2004 using the same denition of civil wars
and data from the database on "Armed Conicts" of PRIO (2006).
Coups: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a coup occurred in a given
country year, recoded from Banks (2005).
Debt service: Total debt service (% of GNI), from World Bank (2006b).
Democracy: Polity IV scores, from CIDCM (2007).
Education spending: Public spending on education as percentage of
GDP, from World Bank (2006a).
Ethnic fractionalization: Index of ethnic fractionalization, updated vari-
able from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
GDP per capita: Per capita gross domestic product in current US$, from
World Bank (2006b).
30
GDP growth: Percentage change on previous years level of GDP per
capita (as dened above).
Government spending: Includes general government nal consumption
spending in percent of GDP, from World Bank (2006b).
Guerrilla: Number of any armed activity, sabotage, or bombing carried
out by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the
overthrow of the present regime, from Banks (2005).
Health spending: Public health expenditures as percentage of GDP, pro-
vided by the World Bank (2006b).
Instability: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 when there was insta-
bility in governing arrangements in any of the previous three years, follow-
ing Fearon and Laitin (2003)s denition and using Polity IV scores, from
CIDCM (2007).
Military spending: Military expenditures as percentage of GDP, provided
by the World Bank (2006b).
Mountainous Territory : Percentage of the territory that is mountainous,
updated variable from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
New State: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 when a state was founded
in the previous two years, updated from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Non-contiguous states: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 when a state
is not contiguous, updated variable from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Oil exporter: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 when a country year
had greater than 33% fuel exports, updated variable from Fearon and Laitin
(2003).
Population: From World Bank (2006b).
Prior wars: Dummy variable taking a value of 1 when a previous war
occurred in a given country.
Religious fractionalization: Index of religious fractionalization, updated
variable from Fearon and Laitin (2003).
Rural population: Percentage of population living in rural areas, from
World Bank (2006b).
Strikes: Number of general strikes of 1000 or more industrial or service
workers that involve more than one employer and that are aimed at national
government policies or authority, from Banks (2005).
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